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WHERE HAVE ALL THE CHILDREN GONE?
THE SUPREME COURT FINDS PRETRIAL
DETENTION OF MINORS CONSTITUTIONAL:
SCHALL v. MARTIN
In 1967 the Supreme Court applied the constitutional guarantee of due
process to juvenile delinquency hearings. That decision, In re Gault,' estab-
lished a mode of analysis for assessing due process requirements in the
juvenile justice system. Subsequent to Gault, the Supreme Court decided
only a few cases regarding the due process rights of children in the juvenile
justice system.' The Supreme Court has followed the Gault mode of analysis
in these decisions, with only one exception. The recent case of Schall v.
Martin3 is this exception.
The Schall Court considered a New York statute that allows pretrial,
preventative detention of accused juveniles. 4 Such detention is authorized by
a court if it determines that there is a "serious risk" that a juvenile will
commit a crime before the adjudication return date.' The Schall Court held
that the statute does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 6 Schall is significant not only because it ignored the Gault mode
of analysis, but also because it failed to establish a new standard of review
to replace Gault. Schall represents the demise of the due process analysis
that was previously used in juvenile justice system proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. In re Gault: The Seminal Case
on Due Process Rights for Children
In re Gault established children's due process rights in juvenile delinquency
proceedings.' In Gault, a fifteen-year-old youth, Gerald Gault, was taken
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text.
3. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
4. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983). See infra notes 89-94 and accom-
panying text.
5. Id.
6. 104 S. Ct. at 2412.
7. One year prior to the Gault decision, the Supreme Court considered juvenile delinquency
proceedings in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Kent Court held that an accused
juvenile delinquent has a right to due process before the state is allowed to try the child as an
adult. Kent is not a major children's rights case, but it provides the constitutional framework
for later cases. See, e.g., Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
into custody for allegedly making obscene phones calls to a neighbor.' The
police neither left notice at Gerald's home that Gerald was in custody, nor
attempted to inform Gerald's parents that he had been arrested.9 The police
detained Gerald for three days before they released him to his mother's
custody.10 At Gerald's hearing, the judge ordered that Gerald be committed
to a state industrial school for six years." Gerald's parents then filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, but the petition was
dismissed by the Arizona Supreme Court. 2 Upon dismissal of the writ,
Gerald's parents sought review from the United States Supreme Court, urging
that the Court find the Juvenile Code of Arizona in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3
The United States Supreme Court in Gault held that due process requires
that a child in a delinquency proceeding has the right to notice of charges,
4
the right to counsel, 5 the right to confront and examine witnesses, 6 and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 7 In reaching these conclusions, the Gault
Court enunciated a mode of analysis that balanced the goals of the juvenile
justice system against juveniles' due process rights. Under this balancing test,
juveniles' due process rights may be abrogated if the exercise of those rights
impairs the goals of the juvenile justice system.' 8
The analysis set forth in Gault was also used by the Court in three later
cases dealing with due process in the juvenile justice system.19 This section
initially explains how Gault and its progeny reviewed and analyzed the goals
of the juvenile justice system. The Gault Court's review of juveniles' due
process rights is also examined. Finally, this section discusses how the Court
and the Limits of Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1015, 1027 (1977) (Gault, not Kent, is the watershed
case granting due process rights to accused juveniles); Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of
Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA
L. REV. 656, 661 (1980) (Kent is the important constitutional backdrop for the Gault decision,
which established the analytical framework for due process rights of children); Rush, The
Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative
Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 461, 478 n.112 (1985) (Gault was first
case to adjudicate rights of the child against the state).
8. 387 U.S. at 4. Police arrested Gerald Gault after the neighbor complained of the phone
calls. Id.
9. Id. at 5. When Gerald's mother returned home from work, a neighbor told her that
Gerald was in police custody. Neither Gerald nor his parents were given a copy of the delinquency
petition filed with the court. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7. At the hearing, the judge asked Gerald for his account of the phone calls.
While Gerald's mother said that her son denied making the phone calls, the judge stated that
Gerald admitted he called the neighbor. Id. at 6.
12. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1976).
13. Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id. at 41.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 18-31. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
19. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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balanced the goals of the juvenile justice system against due process rights
in Gault and its progeny.
1. Defining the Goals of the Juvenile Justice System
The Gault Court reviewed the historical background of the juvenile justice
system. According to the Court, history revealed that the juvenile system
was created to protect children from the "rigidities, technicalities, and
harshness" of adult procedures and penalties.20 The founders of the juvenile
justice system reasoned that the state should not act as a child's adversary,
but as a parent.2 The goal was to rehabilitate, not to punish, the child. 22
Intimacy and informality therefore characterized the delinquency proceed-
ing. 23
2. Establishing the Purpose of Due Process Guarantees
After the Gault Court outlined the historical foundation of the juvenile
justice system, it considered whether children are entitled to due process in
that system.24 The Court's discussion was not couched in terms of adults'
or children's rights. It was, instead, a broad analysis of constitutional
considerations. According to the Court, due process of law is the basis of
the individual's right to be free from unreasonable state regulation.25 In
particular, a person officially accused of criminal conduct has a right to
notice of the charges26 in order to prepare a defense, and a right to counsel
20. 387 U.S. at 15.
21. Id. at 16. A separate juvenile court was first established in America in 1899 with the
passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, 1899 111. Laws 131 repealed
by Act of Aug. 5, 1965, 1965 I1. Laws 2585 [codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.37, §§ 701-1 to
708-41. This Act's goal was to ensure that the state provided "care, custody and discipline" to
the child, as if it were the child's parent. Id. § 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 131, 137. The act mitigated
the harshness of adult criminal courts by allowing the juvenile court judge to be personal and
human. For a further discussion of the state's role in juvenile justice proceedings, see Handler,
The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 7, 10 (the state should not act as the child's enemy, but as the child's protector) and
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). See also Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (1970) (prior to 1899, direct
referral to reform school allowed many juveniles to avoid a full-blown trial).
22. The juvenile justice system is committed to a "rehabilitative ideal." Feld, Reference of
Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable
Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 515 (1978). The state should not punish the child, but
reform, uplift, and develop the child. Mack, supra note 21, at 107. The founders of the juvenile
justice system considered children to be educable and reformable. Paulsen, Kent v. United
States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 169.
23. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18. The juvenile justice system was founded on individualized treatment.
of juvenile offenders. Feld, supra note 22, at 515. The system dispensed with the standard
courtroom and replaced it with a room where the judge and child could sit next to each other.
Juvenile proceedings were designed to allowed the child to feel the state's care and solicitude.
Mack, supra note 21, at 120.
24. 387 U.S. at 10.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Id. at 33 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1948)).
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in order to guide the accused through the legal proceedings.2 7 An accused's
privilege against self-incrimination is also necessary to ensure that any confes-
sion made by the accused is trustworthy and to prevent the state from
coercing the accused into a confession.2"
In the subsequent case of In re Winship 9 the Court followed the Gault
analysis by first reviewing the historical foundation of the juvenile justice
system and then discussing the purposes and goals of the reasonable-doubt
standard in criminal proceedings.30 In Winship, a twelve-year-old boy was
accused of breaking into a locker and stealing money from a woman's
purse.3 The boy was charged with delinquency because his acts, if committed
by an adult, would be considered crimes. The New York Family Court Act
provided that a guilty finding in a juvenile delinquency adjudication must
be based on a preponderance of the evidence.32 Winship argued that due
process required that proof be established beyond a reasonable doubt.33 The
judge rejected this argument, found the youth guilty, and sentenced him to
a minimum of eighteen months in a training school.3 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that a child is constitutionally
entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violating a
criminal law.35 Following the Gault analysis, the Winship Court found that
the purpose of the reasonable-doubt standard is to reduce the risk of
erroneous convictions and prevent innocent individuals from being deprived
of their liberty. 6 Moreover, the reasonable-doubt standard is "indispensable
to command the respect and confidence of the community. 3 7 The Court
explained that society should never fear that innocent people are being
wrongly condemned by the government. 8
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania," the Court again applied the Gault mode
of analysis by comparing the goals behind the juvenile justice system with
the purposes of the due process guarantee of a jury trial."' Joseph McKeiver, a
sixteen-year-old, was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods.4
27. 387 U.S. at 36 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
28. 387 U.S. at 47 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
29. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
30. Id. at 366.
31. Id. at 360.
32. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1983).
33. 397 U.S. at 360.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 365.
36. Id. at 362 (citing Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)).
37. 387 U.S. at 364.
38. Id.
39. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
40. Id. at 530.
41. Id. at 534. McKeiver's case was consolidated with another similar case from Pennsylvania
and several similar cases from North Carolina. In each case, the youth, after being denied a
jury trial, was found guilty by a judge of committing an act that would be a crime if committed
by an adult. Id. at 535-38.
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The juvenile court denied McKeiver's request for a jury trial. 42 The judge
found McKeiver guilty and placed him on probation.4 3
The McKeiver Court relied on the Gault mode of analysis by setting out
the purposes underlying the due process right to a jury trial. The McKeiver
Court observed that the right to an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions
is guaranteed by the Constitution and is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice." 44 One purpose of the jury requirement is to assure that
criminal defendants have an impartial and accurate fact-finding proceeding.45
In McKeiver, however, the Court determined that a jury trial is not guar-
anteed in juvenile delinquency proceedings for various reasons. 46
The Gault Court's analysis was again used in Breed v. Jones.4 1 In Breed,
a seventeen-year-old boy was charged with and found guilty of armed
robbery.4" At a later disposition hearing, the court determined that the youth
was not amenable to the care, treatment, and training program of the juvenile
court, and declared that he was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. 9 The judge
therefore ordered that the youth be prosecuted as an adult.5 0 The youth filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that another trial would place
him in double jeopardy. The petition was denied; the youth was tried in the
superior court and found guilty.5
In deciding that the child was protected from double jeopardy,5 2 the Breed
Court found that a trial placed "psychological, physical, and financial"
burdens on the accused person. 3 The purpose of the Constitution's prohi-
bition against double jeopardy is to ensure that an individual is subjected
42. Id. at 535.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 540 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 210-11 (1968)).
45. 403 U.S. at 540-44.
46. The Court enumerated 13 reasons for rejecting the juvenile's right to a jury trial: (1)
the Court should not turn Gault into a guaranteed incorporation of all due process guarantees
in juvenile court proceedings, id. at 545; (2) a jury would disrupt the intimate and informal
setting of the proceedings, id.; (3) the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice did not recommend a jury trial in its juvenile justice Task Force
Report, id. at 545-46; (4) a jury is not even required in some adult proceedings, id. at 547; (5)
a jury would not enhance the reliability of fact-finding in a juvenile proceeding, id.; (6) states
should be allowed to experiment with juvenile justice procedures, id.; (7) providing a jury trial
would not rectify the abuses perceived in the juvenile justice system, id. at 547-48; (8) the
juvenile court judge has the discretion to provide a jury in difficult juvenile cases under state
law, id. at 548; (9 & 10) most states, by statute or judicial law, reject the juvenile's right to a
jury trial, id. at 548-49; and (11) professionals in the field of juvenile justice reject the use of
a jury in juvenile proceedings, id. at 549-50. The twelfth and thirteenth reasons reiterated the
second reason. Id. at 550.
47. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
48. Id. at 521.
49. Id. at 523.
50. Id. at 524.
51. Id. at 525.
52. Id. at 520.
53. Id. at 530.
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to this harrowing experience only once for the same offense.54 The Court
concluded that any burden on the juvenile justice system caused by double
jeopardy is outweighed by the due process benefits to the juvenile."
3. Balancing the Juvenile Justice Goals and the Due Process Guarantees
By clearly defining the goals of the juvenile justice system and the objec-
tives of due process, the Gault Court balanced the significance of the due
process guarantee to the juvenile against the juvenile justice system's need
for simplified procedures. The Gault Court first noted that the principle of
treating the child separately from the adult is not undermined by recognizing
the child's rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and against self-
incrimination. 6 Second, when a relaxed procedural setting is followed by
stern discipline, the Court reasoned that a child may feel deprived and resist
rehabilitative efforts."' Most importantly, in reality a youth charged with
misconduct may be committed to an institution for a number of years.58 The
Constitution requires the "exercise of care" 9 with respect to due process.
In examining the delinquency hearing setting, the Gault Court noted that
the goals of the juvenile justice system are actually enhanced by recognition
of certain procedural safeguards.'
The Court in Winship also balanced the goals of the juvenile justice system
against the accused's due process interest in requiring that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt be established. 6 The Court found that using the reasonable-
doubt standard has no effect on the distinctive juvenile proceeding. 62 The
informality, flexibility, and speed of the adjudicatory hearing is unimpaired.6 3
The Winship Court, like the Gault Court, took a realistic view of the juvenile
54. Id. (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
55. 421 U.S. at 536. Before the state can transfer the child to the adult court, the state
must give the accused a hearing and observe other aspects of due process. See Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
56. 387 U.S. at 22. The Court responded to the argument that the unique benefits of
juvenile justice would offset any disadvantage caused by a lack of due process. The Court
concluded that depriving a juvenile of due process did not reduce juvenile crime rates, and that
special juvenile procedures would not be impaired when due process is applied. Id. at 21-22.
57. Id. at 26 (citing S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION
AND CONTROL (1966)). The Court relied on a sociological study which concluded that unless
juveniles receive due process they will consider the juvenile justice system to be unfair and will
resist efforts for their rehabilitation. See infra note 126.
58. 387 U.S. at 27. Gerald Gault was adjudicated a delinquent and sentenced to six years
in a state industrial school. Id. at 7. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. The Supreme
Court noted that had Gault been an adult, his maximum sentence would have been a fine of
five to 50 dollars, or imprisonment for a maximum of two months. 387 U.S. at 29.
59. Id. at 28.
60. See supra notes 56-57.
61. 397 U.S. at 368.
62. Id. at 366.
63. Id. The standard does not affect the opportunity for review of the child's social history
or individualized treatment during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing, and does not
affect the unique proceedings prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Id.
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delinquency hearing: since the state has many advantages in the hearing, the
accused's due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is essential
to protect innocent defendants. 64
In McKeiver, the Court again followed the mode of analysis established
in Gault, but concluded that a jury trial is not constitutionally mandated
for juvenile delinquency hearings. 65 The McKeiver Court determined that a
jury trial would place the juvenile proceeding in an adversarial setting, and
would destroy the intimate and informal atmosphere of the proceeding. 66 If
a jury were required, the Court reasoned, the juvenile proceeding would
become a true criminal trial, 67 and would possibly eliminate the court's
opportunity to be sympathetic and paternal. 68 Moreover, the Court found
that a jury trial would not strengthen the fact-finding process. 69 The Court
concluded that the goals and interests of the juvenile justice system outweigh
the defendant's interest in having a jury trial at the juvenile delinquency
hearing. 70
The Gault mode of analysis was also used in Breed, which held that a
child tried in juvenile court cannot subsequently be prosecuted later as an
adult for the same offense. 7 According to the Breed majority, avoidance of
double jeopardy requires that the child be transferred to the adult court
before the juvenile hearing. 2 The Court further stated that if transfer
hearings were performed prior to juvenile delinquency adjudications, the
goals of the juvenile justice system would actually be strengthened. As the
Court noted, the informal and paternal nature of the juvenile justice system
would be hampered if juveniles knew that they might subsequently be
transferred to the adult court and subjected to a second trial for the same
offense."
The Gault decision introduced a mode of analysis that has proven to be
a rational and reasonable means of determining children's rights in the
juvenile justice system. In cases subsequent to Gault, the Court reviewed
both the goals of the system and the importance of the particular procedure
that affected the accused. The burdens of imposing the due process guar-
antees on the system were balanced against the benefits of due process to
64. Id.
65. 403 U.S. at 545.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 547. The juvenile justice system was established as a civil, rather than criminal,
court system. The reformers wanted a system that would care for, and not punish the child.
Mack, supra note 21, at 120. The founders of the juvenile justice system rejected the criminal
procedure because the child was viewed as "society's child" and the interests of the state were
the same as that of the child's. Because the interests coincided, there was no need for the
criminal adversary procedure. Handler, supra note 21, at 10. See supra notes 21-22, infra note
112 and accompanying text.
68. 403 U.S. at 550.
69. Id. at 543 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).
70. 403 U.S. at 550. But see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 118
(1971) (jury trial is "essential to the appearance of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness" to
both the child and society).
71. 421 U.S. at 541.
72. Id. at 537.
73. Id. at 540.
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the juveniles. This balancing assured that the juvenile justice system afforded
the child "the essentials of due process and fair treatment." 74
B. Due Process Requirements of Pretrial Detention
The principal case on due process in the pretrial detention of adults is
Gerstein v. Pugh.75 In Gerstein, the Supreme Court held that the "Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prereq-
uisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." '7 6 The Court further
held that this probable cause determination must be made either before
or immediately after arrest.7 7 The Gerstein Court recognized that the fourth
amendment's protection against invasions of liberty usually requires judicial
determination of probable cause before a police officer makes an arrest."
As a "practical compromise" 7 9 with law enforcement interests, however, the
police are allowed to make warrantless arrests based upon an "on-the-scene
assessment of probable cause." 8" Once an individual is arrested and taken
into custody without a warrant, the state's need for summary action van-
ishes.8 Meanwhile, the need for a probable cause hearing becomes important
to protect the suspect's employment and prevent harmful effects on his
family. Thus, the Gerstein Court reasoned that a judicial probable cause
hearing held immediately after an arrest would protect individual liberty
from state interference. s2
Another landmark case in the area of pretrial detention is Bell v. Wolfish."3
In Bell, the Court considered the due process implications of pretrial deten-
tion.8 4 The Court held that jail conditions may create constitutional violations
74. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
75. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
76. Id. at 114. A violation of the requirement to a probable cause hearing has no exclusionary
remedy. The Gerstein Court specifically stated that an illegal detention does "not void a
subsequent conviction." Id. at 119.
77. Id. at 125.
78. Id. at 113. Before an arrest is made, the police officer should obtain an arrest warrant
that is based on probable cause. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within
[the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The
warrant must be issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
79. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
80. Id. The Court found that a constitutional rule barring arrests without a prior review of
probable cause would be an "intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement." Id. Law
enforcement policy is made by the police. Their duties are such that they often exercise personal
discretion in making an arrest. Therefore, the police "interpret the law" of probable cause in
each situation that arises. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 10 (1967).
81. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114. Once suspects are in custody, they have little chance to
escape or commit further crimes.
82. Id.
83. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
84. Id. at 535.
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when they amount to punishment of the detainee. 5 The Court noted that
the conditions of confinement and restriction would be considered punish-
ment if they were imposed either arbitrarily or with an intent to punish . 6
If, on the other hand, the conditions of confinement were reasonably related
to a legitimate state purpose, no punishment would be deemed to have
occurred .1 7 Relying on Gerstein, the Bell Court addressed the conditions of
confinement rather than the constitutionality of pretrial detention itself. The
Bell Court determined that a state could only detain an accused before trial
by complying with the constitutional requirements set forth in Gerstein; a
judicial determination of probable cause must be made before or immediately
after arrest."
THE Schall DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Gregory Martin, a fourteen-year-old boy, was arrested and charged
with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession
of a weapon."9 He was arrested pursuant to the New York Family Court
Act (the Act)9" which governs all procedures within New York's juvenile
justice system. The Act requires that police officers immediately notify
a parent or legal guardian when a child is arrested.9' If the child is
accused of committing a serious crime, 92 or if a parent cannot be found,
the child may appear directly before the family court. 9 When the child
appears directly, the judge must appoint a legal guardian for the child
and advise the child of the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Unless these or other special circumstances arise,94 the
85. Id. The Court noted that due process, not the eighth amendment, was the proper
basis for regulating pretrial detention. Id. at 535 n.16. Since pretrial detainees have not been
adjudicated guilty, due process prohibits their punishment. The eighth amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment" is the constitutional basis for regulating post-conviction
incarceration. Id.
86. Id. at 539.
87. Id. at 533-34.
88. Id. at 534 n.15 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
89. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
90. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983). Section 320.5(3) states, in pertinent
part:
The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and reasons
for so finding that unless the respondent is detained;
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an act
which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.
Id.
91. Id.
92. The category of serious crime includes murder, kidnapping, arson, assault, manslaughter,
rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary. Id. § 301.2(8).
93. Id. § 305.2(4)(b).
94. Id. A special circumstance might arise if, for example, the family court is not in session
and the parents cannot be found. Under these circumstances, the arresting officer may take
the child directly to a juvenile detention facility. Id. § 305.2(4)(c). If this occurs, the child must
19851
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child is issued an initial appearance ticket after arrest and is released to
the custody of a parent or guardian. 95 A delinquency petition,96 which
initiates the legal proceeding, is then filed. 97
After the delinquency petition is filed, the accused juvenile must return
to the court for the initial appearance," where the judge decides to either
release or detain the accused until the fact-finding return date.9 9 Section
320.5(b) of the Act allows pretrial detention of an accused juvenile if the
court finds there is a "serious risk" that the accused, before the return date,
may commit an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. "' The
judge must state "facts and reasons"'" for detaining the juvenile. Never-
theless, such reasons need not be based on a specific finding of probable
cause that the juvenile actually committed a crime." 2 Moreover, the statute
does not specify the factors to be considered, the standards of proof, or the
procedures for the judge to follow in making the detention decision.
After Gregory Martin's arrest pursuant to the Act, a delinquency petition
was filed.'"" The family court judge ordered that Martin be detained pursuant
be brought before the family court within 72 hours or during the next day court is in session,
whichever is sooner. Id. § 307.3(4).
95. Id. § 307.1(1). The initial appearance ticket is a written notice directing the child and
parent, or legal guardian, to appear at a probation service on a specified date.
96. Section 732 of the New York Family Court Act provides:
A proceeding to adjudicate a person to be in need of supervision is originated by
the filing of a petition, alleging:
(a) the respondent is an habitual truant or is incorrigible, ungovernable, or
habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of his parents, guardian or
lawful custodian, and specifying the acts on which the allegations are based and
the time and place they allegedly occurred;
(b) the respondent, if male, was under sixteen years of age and, if female, was
under eighteen years of age at the time of specified acts; and
(c) the respondent requires supervision or treatment.
Id. § 732.
97. Id. § 310.1(1).
98. id. § 320.1.
99. Id. § 320.5(l). The fact-finding proceeding is the juvenile justice system's equivalent to
a trial. The child has a right to counsel, id. § 341.2(1), evidence may be suppressed on the
same grounds as in a criminal trial, id. § 330.2, and proof of guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. § 342.2(2).
100. A crime is defined as a misdemeanor or felony, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney
1975). In turn, a misdemeanor is an offense for which a sentence "of imprisonment in excess
of fifteen days may be imposed," id. § 10.00(4), and a felony is an offense for which a sentence
"of imprisonment in excess of one year may be imposed." Id. § 10.10(5). Thus a child accused
of shoplifting (petty larceny) or sneaking onto private property (criminal trespass) could be
detained because according to § 320.5(3)(b), a judge may order pretrial detention of a youth
accused of any minor crime. The decision to detain is not necessarily based on the juveniles'
dangerous or violent behavior. See Note, Justice for Juveniles? The Second Circuit Declares
Juvenile Prevention Detention Unconstitutional, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517, 530 n.44 (1984).
101. See supra note 90.
102. See, e.g., Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2416 n.27 (judge not required to find probable cause
when detaining accused juvenile); cf. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 685
n.2, 350 N.E.2d 906, 907 n.2, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 n.2 (1976) (court disregards question of
whether facts on the record need to support the finding of judge to warrant continued detention
of accused juvenile).
103. Schall. 104 S. Ct. at 2406 & n.6.
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to section 320.5(b) of the statute. °4 After five days of detention, the court
held a probable cause hearing and found that there was probable cause that
Martin had committed the crimes. While still in detention, Martin filed a
habeas corpus class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the pretrial
detention statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. 105 Martin's suit was brought on behalf of a class
of all juveniles detained pursuant to the Act's pretrial detention provision.0 6
The federal district court rejected the equal protection challenge as insub-
stantial, 07 but found that the statutory provision violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court declared that the provision
was unconstitutional because it allows judges to make detention decisions
arbitrarily."'8 Because pretrial detention constitutes punishment," 9 the court
found that pretrial detention without prior adjudication of probable cause
is a per se violation of the due process clause.'' 0 The court of appeals
affirmed the decision, stating that the law violated due process because its
unlimited terms facilitate erroneous detention decisions and because the
detention serves as punishment."'
B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Rationale
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision. The
Court first found that the state's interest as parens patriae" 2 in protecting
the accused child and society from the child's future criminal acts" 3 out-
104. The judge reasoned that Martin lacked supervision because he was arrested at 11:30
p.m. and possessed a loaded weapon. Id. at 2407.
105. Id. at 2408.
106. Id. Two other youths were class plaintiffs. Luis Rosario, a 14-year-old, was charged
with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault for allegedly trying to rob two
men. He was detained six days before a fact-finding hearing was held. Twenty-one days after
probable cause was found, he was released to his father's custody. Id. at 2407. Fourteen-year-
old Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and grand larceny. Id. He was
detained for eight days before probable cause was found. Id. at 2407-08.
107. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
108. Id. at 707-14.
109. Id. at 715-16.
110. Id. at 707-16. The Court found that § 739 was violative both on its face and as
applied. Id. at 717.
111. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 366, 377 (2d Cir. 1982).
112. Parens patriae was defined at common law as the King's duty to take care of his
subjects who were legally unable to care for themselves because of mental incapacity. See J.
CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 (1820). Parens
patriae was traditionally viewed as one of the King's royal prerogatives. I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *237 (Lewis ed. 1899). The scope of parens patriae
eventually included protection of children. Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance
of "Parens Patriae", 22 S.C.L. REV. 147, 166 (1970).
Parens patriae was first used in America to justify statutory commitment of juveniles to a
residential institute. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, II (Penn. 1839). In Crouse, the court stated
that the purpose of the institute was to improve and reform the child by providing wholesome
restraints and protection from depraved parents or an impoverished environment. Id. The
juvenile justice system uses the state's parens patriae power to accomplish its goal of rehabili-
tating the child. Under the parens patriae doctrine, the child is not treated as a criminal and
is therefore saved from that stigmatization. Mack, supra note 21, at 109.
113. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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weighed the child's liberty interest.' 4 Second, the Court determined that the
statute was not intended to punish the child; the detention is strictly limited
in time, and the terms and conditions of confinement are compatible with
the state's legitimate regulatory purposes."' Third, the Court upheld the
validity of the statute because, in its view, the procedure provides adequate
protection against unnecessary pretrial detention.'
6
114. 104 S. Ct. at 2410. The Court asserted that a child's liberty interests are not as strong
as an adult's because the child is "always in some form of custody." Id. (citing Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Serv., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17
(1967)). See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 2413. The New York statute provides two types of confinement for
juveniles. Non-secure detention is a halfway house, an open facility in the community, where
the child receives schooling and counseling. Secure detention is a locked dormatory. After
arrest, the court screens the accused and places the accused in one of these detention areas. Id.
116. Id. at 2417. The Court also explained that because the child is given "notice, a hearing,
and a statement of facts and reasons" for the judge's decision, the statute is not unconstitu-
tionally vague. Id. In contrast to the Supreme Court, the district court found that despite
procedural safeguards, standardless decisions to detain youths because of the "serious risk" of
future criminality resulted in too many unnecessary detentions. See supra text accompanying
notes 108-10. The district court based this conclusion on expert testimony and numerous studies
on the subject of predicting future criminality. 513 F. Supp. at 708-12. The testimony and
studies revealed that judges could not predict criminality because the study of human behavior
was not that advanced. Id. at 712. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure
for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 197 n.189 (1984).
The Schall Court asserted that, from a "legal point of view," future criminality could be
predicted. 104 S. Ct. at 2417. The Court explained that such predictions were often made in
sentencing and parole proceedings. Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 9-10 (1979); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
The Court further explained that predictions of future criminality were also used to impose
sentences under the "dangerous" special offender statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982). 104 S. Ct.
at 2417 n.30. The dangerous offender statute allows a sentence longer than that provided for
the underlying felony to be imposed because the offender is considered dangerous. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(f). The purpose of the statute is to protect the public from the dangerous offender's
anticipated future criminal conduct. Id. The Schall Court noted that the statute has been
challenged unsuccessfully as unconstitutionally vague. 104 S. Ct. at 2417 n.30 (citing United
States v. Davis, 710 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 505 (1983); United States v.
Schell, 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir.
1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Neary, 552
F.2d 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976)).
The Scholl Court stated that judges use their experience as well as "a host of variables" in
predicting future criminal conduct. 104 S. Ct. at 2418. Such experience cannot be codified. Id.
Supporting this conclusion in the context of the New York statute, the Court relied on a family
court judge's testimony at the habeas corpus trial that determinations of pretrial detention
under the New York statute are based on various factors: the nature and seriousness of the
charges against the youth, the likelihood that the charges are true, the adequacy and effectiveness
of home supervision, the time of day of the alleged crime, and the absence of parental
supervision. Id.
The Schall Court stated that a statement of facts and reasons for the decision in a particular
case may substitute for specific factors in the statute itself. Id. The Schall majority's analysis
on this point is not convincing. In fact, the district court struck down the statute for nearly
the same reasons the Supreme Court upheld it. The district court invalidated the statute because
it believed that the law did not give a family court judge any guidelines in making the decision
to detain a youth. Therefore, according to the district court, two judges could arrive at different
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The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, disputed every major aspect of the majority opinion. The
dissent reasoned that a state may detain citizens only if the detention is
supported by an important state interest." 7 The dissent challenged the ma-
jority's conclusion that the Act promotes the important state interest of
protecting the child and society from the child's further criminal activity.' 8
The dissent also argued that the statute was used primarily to impose
punishment for unadjudicated criminal acts."19 Finally, the dissent criticized
the majority's finding that the statute provides safeguards against erroneous
pretrial detention. There is great risk that children will be improperly de-
tained, the dissent concluded, if the juvenile justice system provides no
statutory or procedural constraints on a judge's ability to detain an accused
youth.'20
conclusions in the same case under the New York law. 513 F. Supp. at 707. The judges'
decisions are "moored to no concrete or reasonably determinable yardsticks .... [E]ach judge
utilizes his own personal standards." Id. The result is that decisions to detain accused delinquents
are arbitrary and unpredictable. Id.
Recognizing the problems of pretrial detention for children, the Institute of Judicial Admin-
istration and the American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards
(the Commission) proposed standards to govern pretrial detention of juveniles. Institute of
Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Project
(1977) (Tent. Draft) [hereinafter cited as Standards]. See Guggenheim, Paternalism, Prevention,
and Punishment: Pretrial Detention of Juveniles, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1064, 1065 (1977). These
standards are superior to existing statutes because they provide strict guidelines that a judge
must use in deciding whether to detain a juvenile. For example, (1) the state has the burden
of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that detention of the accused youth is necessary
and that no less-intrusive alternative will suffice. Standards, supra, at 4.2. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 45-421(f) (1983 Supp.); (2) when a child is detained, a petition for release must be filed
within 24 hours of the arrest, and the release hearing must be held within 24 hours of the
filing. Standards, supra, at 6.5(D)(2), 7.6 (A); (3) to detain the child, the court must find both
a statutory basis for detention and probable cause that the child committed the act for which
the charge was made. Standards, supra, at 7.6(F).
These rigorous standards are beneficial. Excessive detention would be eliminated. The judge
would have comprehensive standards to follow when making detention decisions. Most impor-
tant, the accused would be able to understand the entire procedure. This understanding would
begin a relationship of trust between the family court judge and the child.
117. 104 S. Ct. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
113-14 (1975)).
118. 104 S. Ct. at 2425 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, society
does not benefit under the New York scheme because, historically, few of the juveniles detained
would have committed second crimes before their trial date. Also, detained children are not
protected under the law; to the contrary, they may actually suffer serious injuries during
incarceration, such as deprivation of liberty and stigmatization as "delinquent." Id. at 2427
(Marshall, J., dissenting), The benefit to those children who would have committed crimes if
left to their own devices is far outweighed by the harms of detention. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to numerous case histories, children
who did not commit crimes while at liberty prior to the initial appearance were subsequently
detained after the initial appearance. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). One family court judge said
that some children are released after a finding of guilt because they had been detained pursuant
to section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act and the judge had decided that the
pretrial detention "constitute[d] sufficient punishment." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1982).
120. 104 S. Ct. at 2431 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further noted that the
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The Schall Court permitted a major violation of due process. By deviating
from the Gault analysis, the Schall Court upheld a statute that permits states
to wield enormous power in detaining suspected juvenile offenders.12' The
New York statute violates due process because it permits incarceration of
a juvenile in a detention center before establishing probable cause that the
child committed crimes. The majority initially observed that a balance must
be struck between the "informal" juvenile proceeding and the "fundamental
fairness" demanded of the due process clause,' 2 2 yet neither branch of this
balancing test was genuinely scrutinized.
A. Defining the Goals of the Juvenile Justice System
Gault, Winship, McKeiver, and Breed each emphasized that the juvenile
justice system was designed to protect the child from the harshness of the
adult criminal justice system. The juvenile court achieved this objective by
acting as a parent, and not as an adversary, to the child. The juvenile justice
system, according to earlier decisions, was also designed to rehabilitate the
child by keeping the juvenile proceedings flexible and informal. 2 The Schall
Court stated that the juvenile justice system should be informal and flexible
in order to "promot[e] the welfare of the child."' 2 4 Yet, the Court unfor-
tunately did not appreciate that the child's welfare is best promoted through
rehabilitation and protection. 2 ' Rehabilitation and protection, as aspects of
the juvenile justice system, cannot be overlooked; informality and flexibility
alone will not suffice. 26 If the proceedings are informal and flexible, but
statute does not limit detention to those juveniles whose "past conduct suggests that they are
substantially more likely" to misbehave in the future. Id. at 2426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the New York statute in People ex rel
Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1976). At the time of
this decision, the provision in question was N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(b). That provision is
identical to the provision at issue in Schall. The New York high court upheld the statute because
the differences between children and adults permitted different procedures without denial of
the child's constitutional right to due process. 39 N.Y.2d at 688-89, 350 N.E.2d at 909.
122. 104 S. Ct. at 2409.
123. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). The language
quoted in Schall defines the proceedings accurately within the juvenile justice system and
explains why a juvenile proceeding is "fundamentally different" from an adult trial. Id.
Interestingly, the Court cited Santosky, a case that considered the due process rights of parents
in a hearing to terminate the parents' rights but did not deal with the juvenile justice system.
125. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
126. If adjudicatory standards for juvenile offenders are informal and ill-defined, they become
meaningless. Handler, supra note 21, at 8. Little has been published on the impact informal
proceedings have on the accused child. Id. at 19. The available studies indicate that too much
informality in juvenile justice proceedings causes juveniles to be confused about the official's
role and the proceeding's standards. The juvenile's confusion undermines the trust and rapport
which are necessary elements for rehabilitation. Id. at 19; see also Studt, The Client's Image
of the Juvenile Court in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 204 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
Dr. Seymour Halleck, former associate professor of psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin
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the child is neither protected nor rehabilitated, the proceedings do not achieve
the purported goals of the juvenile justice system.
After discussing the general aspects of juvenile cases, the Schall majority
stated that the specific purpose of New York's pretrial detention statute was
to protect the child and society from the child's future criminal acts. 2 7
According to the pretrial detention statute, the judge must consider both the
best interests of the child and the need to protect the community from the
child when deciding whether detention is appropriate.' 28 The Schall majority
interpreted the "best interests" of the child to be freedom from "institutional
restraints"' 2 9 and protection from the "downward spiral" of criminal activ-
ity. ,30 Although the interests delineated by the Court are legitimate, they are
not the most important interests. Rather, the Court should have focused its
analysis on whether detention would foster the rehabilitation, "encourage-
ment," and "guidance" of the child.' 3 ' Informal and flexible proceedings
can promote these objectives. The pretrial detention proceeding should be
flexible enough to meet the particular needs of each individual youth who
Medical School, discovered that juveniles are subjected to a "large dose of lying, hypocrisy,
and arbitrariness" by adults within the juvenile justice system. By the time the child is brought
to a professional psychologist, the feeling of trust for adults in positions of power is replaced
with feelings of contempt, fear, and cynicism. The ability to help the child is then greatly
diminished. Halleck, The Impact of Professional Dishonesty on Behavior of Disturbed Ado-
lescents, Soc. WORK, Apr. 1963, at 48. The present treatment of children within the juvenile
justice system "encourages or precipitates deviant behavior and destroys basic values and
rights." Handler, supra note 21, at 20; see also Halleck, supra, at 49.
Other legal professionals have concluded that extremely informal proceedings within the
juvenile justice system actually harm the child. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (1964) (former University of Michigan Law School dean found that
arbitrary and undisciplined power in juvenile justice system "retarded rather than advanced"
the objectives of the system); M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF JUVENILE COURTS AND THE RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN 108 (1975) (former University of Virginia Law School dean discovered that
children's contact with juvenile courts leads to further delinquency).
127. 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
128. N.Y. FAM. CT, ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983). The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1976, 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 878, § 2, added a clause to the New York Family Court Act
requiring that judges consider the needs of the child "as well as the need of protection of the
community." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) (emphasis added).
The purpose of the original Act had been to consider only the needs of the child. Note,
supra note 100, at 519 n.4. After passage of the Reform Act, questions arose as to whether
the child's best interest or the community's needs should be most important in the judge's
decision. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) (practice commentary at 266). The New
York courts interpreted the new clause to mean that the child's best interest must be the most
important factor in the judge's decision to detain. See, e.g., In re Rudy S., 100 Misc. 2d 1112,
1116, 420 N.Y.S.2d 549, 556 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (best interest of child is primary consider-
ation); People v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 328, 330, 416 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979)
(child's interest in most important); In re Elizabeth J., 98 Misc. 2d 362, 364, 413 N.Y.S.2d
867, 868 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (weigh need of community only after fact-finding proceeding
has occurred).
129. 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
130. Id. at 2411.
131. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932). See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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appears before the judge. 3 ' In the initial phase of this flexible proceeding,
the judge must inquire whether the child committed the crime and, if so,
why the crime was committed. The child's answers to the judge's inquiries
are the first steps toward rehabilitation. This question-and-answer session
should be informal to allow the judge to gain the child's trust and respect.13
The Schall majority, unfortunately, did not address the underlying reha-
bilitative aims of informal and flexible procedures.
B. Establishing the Purpose of Due Process Guarantees
The Schall Court's decision also rests on a misleading and inaccurate
interpretation of Gerstein v. Pugh. 3 4 According to the Schall Court, Gerstein
simply held that "a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite
to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime."' 35
The Schall Court stated that Gerstein left open the timing of the probable
cause hearing. Finally, the Court concluded that the several-day-delays of
probable cause hearings under the New York statute are permissible under
Gerstein. In fact, however, Gerstein did not leave room in its language for
such delays. The Gerstein Court held that before or immediately after arrest,
or before there is a significant restraint on an accused's liberty, a probable
cause hearing must be held; otherwise, the accused's detention is unconsti-
tutional. 3 6 By omitting this aspect of the Gerstein holding, the Schall Court
gave the impression that a probable cause hearing is not necessary until after
the accused has been detained for an extended time. Thus, the Court silently
repudiated its own precedent.
The Schall Court also ignored Gerstein's language on the importance of
an immediate probable cause hearing, and highlighted the decision's second-
ary concern with the flexibility and informality of pretrial detention hear-
ings. 37 Because the initial hearing for a juvenile under the New York statute
is flexible, the Schall Court found the proceeding to be constitutionally
sound and in accordance with Gerstein's holding. "' Although the Gerstein
132. Children need special protection because they may not be mature enough to assert their
own rights. Kaufman, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to Reforming the
Crazy-Quilt Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 743, 747 (1982). The purpose of the
parens patriae doctrine is to allow the state to promote the individual child's best interest. See
supra note 112. The family court judge must take the time to understand the child's perspective
on the justice system. This allows the judge to reach the underlying cause of the child's troubles
and to "formulate the plan" to cure these troubles. Mack, supra note 21, at 119.
133. See supra notes 22-23.
134. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
135. 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
136. 420 U.S. 123, 125. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Lower federal courts
interpret the statement "immediately after arrest" to be the Gerstein probable cause hearing
standard. See, e.g., Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th
Cir. 1982) (probable cause found within 15 hours of arrest is constitutional as a brief period
required for administrative purposes); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.
Tex. 1982), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984) (probable cause hearing must be held within
24 hours after arrest).
137. 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
138. Id. at 2417.
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Court stated that a flexible pretrial procedure is desirable, it also held that
due process would not permit a lengthy postponement of the probable cause
hearing. 3 9 The Gerstein Court correctly determined that whatever procedure
a state uses in its pretrial detention practices, the procedure must provide a
fair and reliable determination of probable cause.'40 The Schall Court ignored
this consideration.
The Schall opinion also avoided the difficult question of how long a
probable cause hearing can be delayed while a defendant is in custody by
taking language from Gerstein out of context. The Schall majority found
that the New York statute allows the juvenile court to delay a probable
cause hearing for up to six days after the initial hearing.' 4' In a footnote,
the Schall Court explained that Gerstein approved a procedure in which the
probable cause hearing was held after five days of detention.' 42 The Schall
majority added this footnote to soften its harsh declaration that a child may
be detained for six days before a probable cause investigation takes place.
The Court's footnoted explanation, however, was inaccurate. The actual
passage in Gerstein described a proposed criminal procedure reform. Under
that procedure, a person arrested without a warrant would be entitled to a
hearing "without unnecessary delay," if kept in custody, to determine if
there were grounds for an arrest warrant. 43 If there was probable cause, the
detainee would be offered a second probable cause hearing within five days
of the arrest. This second hearing would be an adversarial hearing, at which
the detainee could summon witnesses. 44 In this passage, the Gerstein Court
did not sanction the constitutionality of a procedure that allows the first
probable cause hearing of a pretrial detainee to be held within five days of
arrest. The Gerstein Court required that probable cause be found immediately
after arrest. The accused could then be detained and a second, more formal,
probable cause hearing would be offered within five days.' 45
The Schall Court also misapplied the holding in Bell v. Wolfish 4 6 when
it determined that New York's pretrial detention procedure did not uncon-
stitutionally punish juvenile defendants.' 47 The issue in Bell was whether
certain conditions of pretrial detention were constitutional. The constitu-
tionality of the detention procedure itself was not examined.'4 The Schall
139. 420 U.S. at 125.
140. Id.
141. 104 S. Ct. at 2416. The New York law states that a detained youth is entitled to a
probable cause hearing within three days, or within four days following the filing of a petition,
whichever occurs sooner, with a possible three-day extension for good cause shown. N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 325.1(1), (2), (3) (McKinney 1983).
142. 104 S. Ct. at 2417 n.28.
143. 420 U.S. at 124 n.25. There is no judicial determination of probable cause at the time
of a warrantless arrest. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
144. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 124 n.25.
145. Id.
146. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
147. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2412.
148. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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majority, however, claimed that Bell found pretrial detention itself not to
be punishment if the terms and conditions of pretrial confinement were
compatible with the state's legitimate regulatory purposes. 49 The dissent in
Schall pointed out that Bell did not delineate what a state must do to justify
pretrial detention. 5" Although the terms and conditions of confinement may
be constitutional, it does not necessarily follow that the preliminary decision
to detain an accused before trial is also constitutional. The Schall majority
did not comprehend this distinction.
C. Balancing the Juvenile Justice System
Goals and the Due Process Guarantees
Unlike Gault and its progeny, Schall did not initiate its analysis of the
New York statute with a fair and exact definition of the juvenile justice
system's goals and purposes. The Schall Court also did not consider the due
process requirements of imposing pretrial detention on an accused person.
The Schall Court's cursory review of the juvenile justice system irrationally
elevated the importance of informality in procedures for pretrial detention
of children. Moreover, the Court's incorrect interpretations of Gerstein and
Bell precluded a fair and exact definition of the due process requirements
for detaining an adult prior to trial.
Premised on these incomplete definitions and inaccurate interpretations,
the Schall decision did not correctly execute the final step of the Gault mode
of analysis. Gault required that the burdens placed on the juvenile justice
system by the inclusion of due process rights be balanced against the benefits
to the child resulting from such rights.' This test required that both sides
of the balancing scale be accurately defined. The Schall majority did not
attain this accuracy.
The Schall Court's analysis is irreconcilable with prior due process cases
within the juvenile justice context in another respect. In all of the prior due
process cases involving the juvenile system, the Court examined data related
to delinquency, and the actual effects on the child of a decision granting or
denying due process rights.' The Schall Court, however, blatantly disre-
149. 104 S. Ct. at 2412, 2414.
150. Id. at 2423 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
152. The Gault Court, for instance, explained that the actual result of the statute in question
was unfair. 387 U.S. at 27-31. After arrest, Gerald Gault was not given notice of the charges
against him, was not advised of his right to an attorney, was not allowed to examine the
witness, and was not provided the privilege against self-incrimination. After denial of all these
rights, however, the youth, who committed a minor offense, was tried and sentenced to
incarceration for six years. Id. at 29. See supra notes 8-11. In Winship, the Court indicated
that the youth's conviction was based on a preponderance of the evidence and was sentenced
to incarceration for up to six years. 397 U.S. at 360. The judge who tried and convicted the
youth admitted that the proof in Winship's case might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. In McKeiver, the Court denied juveniles the right to a jury trial. The Court reasoned
that a jury is not a "necessary component of accurate fact-finding;" a trial in which the judge
acts as fact-finder can be as fair and accurate as a jury trial. 403 U.S. at 543. Finally, the
Breed Court incorporated the privilege against double jeopardy into juvenile proceedings because
the alternative was to subject juveniles to the harrowing experience of a second trial for the
same offense in the adult system. 421 U.S. at 523-24.
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garded the actual effect of the New York statute on the child. The Court
had more than just one youth's experience on which to base its conclusions.
The district court received thirty-four case histories of youths detained
pursuant to the statute.'53 These histories convinced both lower courts that
the statute was unconstitutional.' 54 Of the thirty-four youths included in the
case histories, twenty-three were released either before or immediately after
their trials.'55 Sixteen children who were released during the period between
their arrests and initial appearances did not commit crimes, even though they
were detained after the initial appearance pursuant to the statute.'5 6 Trial
testimony indicated that the thirty-four cases were typical of all those brought
pursuant to the statute, a point noted by the dissent. 57 Furthermore, several
amici briefs argued that the thirty-four cases histories were similar to na-
tionwide statistics.'5 9 The majority, however, did not consider this data in
its analysis on the ground that it was flawed and unrepresentative.
Prior to Schall, Supreme Court decisions concerning the juvenile justice
system scrutinized the practical impact of the particular proceeding in ques-
tion. The Gault Court noted that without due process in the juvenile justice
system, children could be improperly incarcerated. 59 Likewise, the Winship
Court acknowledged that if the juvenile court could rely on a preponderance
of the evidence to find delinquency, rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, many more innocent children could possibly suffer a loss of liberty.'6
While the McKeiver Court recognized that the juvenile justice system would
become adversarial if a jury trial were allowed,' 6' the Breed Court observed
that the paternal nature of the juvenile proceeding would be destroyed if
the child were not protected from double jeopardy. 62
The New York statute challenged in Schall creates numerous unfair situ-
ations. For example, the statute allows children to be easily detained, and
creates situations in which innocent children may be improperly incarcer-
ated. 63 A requirement that family court judges find probable cause before
detaining juveniles would not create an adversarial hearing. Rather, a judge
153. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 695-700 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
154. Id.; United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1982).
155. United States ex reL Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 695-700 (2d Cir. 1982).
156. Id. at 693.
157. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2421 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2415 n.23.
159. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163. Most state statutes only allow pretrial detention of adults to ensure that the accused
will be present at trial. But see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1983)
(pretrial detention of adults allowed to protect community); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (pretrial
detention of adults allowed if judicial officer determines that accused "may flee or pose a
danger to any other person or the community").
The New York statute's use of pretrial detention to protect society from criminal acts by
juveniles could quite possibly result in an increased number of children being detained because
a finding of probable cause is not required. See supra notes 102, 140 and accompanying text.
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would be able to more easily maintain a paternal relationship with the
accused child when the child knows that the risk of erroneous detainment is
reduced.164 The Schall majority, however, did not discuss the positive and
negative impacts of the probable cause proceeding on the juvenile justice
system.' Unlike prior cases in this area, Schall ignored the purposes of the
juvenile justice system. The dissenters, relying on Gault and its progeny,
correctly concluded that the detention statute was unconstitutional because
of the serious harm it placed on the child and the juvenile system with little
reciprocal benefit to society. 116 The majority rejected this conclusion, stating
that the only question before it was whether the law comported with con-
stitutional standards. ' The majority's statement indicated that, despite the
precedent of Gault, the Court believed that special aspects of the juvenile
justice system play no role in these constitutional determinations.
IMPACT
The Schall Court's treatment of children's constitutional rights was abys-
mal. The Schall Court recognized that a child has a due process liberty
interest in being free from unwarranted incarceration," but it qualified that
interest by observing that a child is always in some form of custody.' The
Court's observation implied that children's due process rights are not as
important as those of adults. This implication enabled the Court to downplay
children's constitutional rights and forego a careful analysis of the due
process requirements of pretrial detention in general.' 7' The Court's analysis
sets a dangerous precedent. If the Court does not recognize that children's
due process rights are as "fundamental"'' as adults', children will not be
protected from unreasonable state regulations."' If the Court does not
164. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
165. See supro notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
166. 104 S. Ct. at 2424, 2433 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority, on the other hand,
held that the statute promoted the child and society. Id. at 2404. Unfortunately, the majority
did not investigate the possible harm to the child caused by detention.
167. Id. at 2419.
168. Id. at 2410.
169. The Court explained that children, because of their youth, are assumed to be unable to
care for themselves. Therefore, children are "subject to the control" of parents, and if the
parent "falters," the state, as parens patriae, will step in to control the child. Id. See supra
note 112.
170. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
171. Fundamental rights are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed under the Constitution. For
example, freedom of speech and freedom of religion are explicitly granted by the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. One implicitly guaranteed fundamental right is the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy found in
penumbra of first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to privacy is implied from penumbra of first amendment).
172. Rush, supra note 7, at 495. Professor Rush contends that children have fundamental
rights, which, if recognized, would allow children who are victims of unreasonable state
regulations to challenge the state. Id. On the other hand, if children's fundamental rights are
not recognized, they have "no judicial outlet" unless their parent challenges the law on the
children's behalf. Id. If the parent brings a suit, however, the court will balance the state's
interest in protecting children against the parent's interest in raising their children. Id. Only by
recognizing children's fundamental rights will the parameters of children's rights be explored.
Id. at 496.
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acknowledge children's due process rights, the state will be able to rely solely
on its parens patriae power to justify its unfair treatment of the accused
child.' 73 Furthermore, future decisions in children's rights cases will lack
consistency and reliability; as the Schall Court implied, it is not necessary
for a court to rigorously assess the due process guarantees granted to an
adult in the analysis of due process rights to be given a child.' 74
Another serious problem with the Schall decision is its deviation from the
precedent set in Gault. The mode of analysis established in Gault is sound
and can be followed by lower federal courts.'75 The juvenile justice system
is not identical to the criminal justice system because some rights given to
adults are not given to children.7 6 Also, the juvenile system advances dif-
ferent goals than its adult criminal counterpart. The juvenile justice system
exists to rehabilitate children, not to punish them. Different aspects of the
juvenile system must be carefully analyzed in each case; the Gault analytical
framework allows a court to make these decisions critically. The Schall
Court, however, did not apply the Gault analysis. The majority in Schall
stated that if a procedure within the juvenile justice system is informal and
flexible, the child need not be afforded constitutional rights.'78 The vague
standard used in Schall does not provide a basis for commencing a consti-
tutional analysis or reviewing a lower court's decision.
The unreliability of the Schall standard is apparent when applied to statutes
that have already been reviewed by lower courts. In Moss v. Weaver,7 ' the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of
173. Rush, supra note 7, at 496-97. A court would apply a higher standard of analysis and
reasoning in children's rights cases if it could not rely on parens patriae. Id. at 492. Reliance
on parens patriae, however, is dangerous. Family interaction is fundamentally private; a state
cannot achieve family-type relations with juveniles. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 705.
174. See supra notes 134-50. By recognizing standards and values in dealing with juvenile
rights that are not "age-related," judicial review is made easier. Rush, supra note 7, at 492.
175. See, e.g., R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
527 (1983) (under Missouri law, juveniles accused of noncriminal acts have a right to a
preliminary probable cause hearing before being detained); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213,
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (juveniles entitled to a probable cause hearing before being detained
prior to trial) (discussed infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text); D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545
F. Supp. 896, 906 (D. Or. 1982) (children may not be placed in adult jails pending adjudication
of criminal charges); United States v. J.D., 517 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (juvenile has
right against self-incrimination during a transfer to adult court proceeding).
The Gault mode of analysis has been used in children's cases outside the juvenile justice
system as well. See, e.g., Joseph A. By Wolfe v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Resources, 575
F. Supp. 346, 352 (D.N.M. 1983) (children entitled to same constitutional rights as adults, but
no case law indicates a constitutional right to foster or adopt family).
176. The only right the Supreme Court has denied to children is the right to a jury trial. See
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. However, most jurisdictions do not give juveniles
the right to bail. But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421(h) (1983 Supp.) (bail set to ensure
appearance of juvenile in court); DEL. FAM. CT. RULE 60(a)(l) (release juvenile upon reasonable
cash bond to assure appearance in court); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 67 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1984 Supp.).
178. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
179. 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Florida's juvenile pretrial detention statute. The statute required that three
factors be weighed by the juvenile court in deciding whether to release or
detain defendants: (1) whether detention was necessary to protect the person
or property of the child or of others; (2) whether a parent was available to
provide adequate care and supervision for the child; and (3) whether the
parent could convincingly assure the court that the child could be present at
the adjudicatory hearing.' 80 The statute did not require a finding of probable
cause to detain the child prior to trial.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed a similar
statute in Cooley v. Stone.' In the District of Columbia, a judge could
detain an arrested child if the facts indicated that releasing the youth was
inadvisable.812 A finding of probable cause was not a prerequisite for pretrial
detention.
Both the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit courts used
the Gault mode of analysis to hold that an immediate finding of probable
cause is necessary to detain a youth prior to trial. The Moss court stated
that under Gerstein, adults have a due process right to a probable cause
hearing before prolonged pretrial detention is allowed." 3 The Cooley court,
which decided its case prior to Gerstein, stated that the fourth amendment
usually requires a determination of probable cause before detention."' Both
courts also correctly reasoned that young alleged offenders would also benefit
from a probable cause hearing." Each court weighed the benefits of requiring
a probable cause hearing against the burden on the juvenile justice system
of observing that requirement. The Moss court concluded that pretrial
detention is an "onerous experience, especially for juveniles,"'1 6 and that
without a finding of probable cause, the juvenile system does not afford the
child the "fundamental fairness" of due process.'8 7 Both the Moss and
Cooley courts found that requiring an immediate finding of probable cause
does not unduly burden the juvenile justice system. Each court concluded
that juveniles have a due process right to an immediate probable cause
hearing before extended incarceration.'
If Moss and Cooley were brought today, and Schall were used as precedent,
the Moss decision would be decided differently and the Cooley decision
would remain the same. Schall established that pretrial detention of juveniles
is constitutional if the procedure is flexible and informal and the detention
serves the legitimate state interests of protecting the child and society from
the child's future criminal activity. The procedures in both Moss and Cooley
meet Schall's flexibility requirement. In both cases, the procedures require
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03(3)(c) (West 1983).
181. 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
182. Id.
183. 525 F.2d at 1260 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
184. 414 F.2d at 1213,
185. Moss, 525 F.2d at 1260; Cooley, 414 F.2d at 1214.
186. 525 F.2d at 1260.
187. Id.
188. Id.; Cooley, 414 F.2d at 1214.
SCHALL v. MARTIN
the judge to assess each youth's individual circumstances to be assured that
a parent is available to care for the child.' 89
These two cases would fare differently, however, under the second part
of the Schall analysis. In the statute considered in Moss, the judge must
consider whether detention is necessary to protect the child and society.'90
The pretrial detention is intended to serve the legitimate state interest and,
therefore, would be upheld under Schall despite the lack of an immediate
probable cause hearing. The procedure in Cooley, on the other hand, does
not purport to advance any legitimate state purpose in detaining the child.
The judge does not have to consider whether detention is necessary to protect
the youth or society.' 9' Pretrial detention of juveniles within the District of
Columbia juvenile system could therefore be struck down under Schall.
Although the procedures considered in these two statutes were similar, the
results would be different if decided after Schall, and the decisions would
therefore appear inconsistent and unreliable.
Preventative detention is harmful to accused juveniles. Confining children
prior to trial hinders their ability to prepare a defense.' 92 Incarceration
prevents children from proving their ability to function at home and in
society.' 93 Preventative detention also disregards the parent's interest in
maintaining custody of children prior to trial. 94 The Gault, Winship, and
189. See supra text accompanying notes 180 and 182.
190. See supra text accompanying note 180.
191. See supra text accompanying note 182.
192. Guggenheim, supra note 116, at 1064.
193. Guggenheim, supra note 116, at 1065; see also NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW
AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 171 (1974); Hoffman & McCarthy, Juvenile Detention Hearings:
The Case for a Probable Cause Determination, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 279 (1975).
194. Parents have the primary responsibility for the child's upbringing under the law.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). See also Kaufman, supra note 132, at 744
(parents responsible for providing protection and guidance); Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1019
(family is primary force in society for developing child's potential); Rush, supra note 7, at 493
(parent-child relationship is sacrosanct under law).
The Supreme Court recognized that in some contexts, parents have a constitutionally protected
right to raise their children without state interference. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
604 (1979) (parents "have the [constitutional] right, coupled with the high duty, to ... prepare
[their children] for additional obligations) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925)); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
846 (1977) (certain areas of family life entitled to procedural and substantive constitutional
protection); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Constitution protects liberty interest
in right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children"). Therefore, it is difficult to
understand how the Schall Court justified the state's detention of juveniles prior to trial without
consideration of the parent's interests. By denying parents the custody of their child, the state
denies the child important developmental opportunities. This may lead to an increase in juvenile
delinquency. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1019-20; see also THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 45 (1967).
The Schall Court upheld the pretrial detention statute as a legitimate exercise of the state's
parens patriae power. See supra note 112. Parens patriae should be invoked only when the
parent "falters" in the control of the child. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410. In her article, Professor
Rush points out that the Schall Court used the parens patriae doctrine without evidence of, or
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Breed courts each noted that the denial of due process rights to an accused
child was unfair. 95 The Schall Court ignored this principle by overlooking
the obvious unfairness that results from denying a child an immediate
probable cause hearing. Unlike the previous cases, the decision to deny
juveniles an immediate probable cause hearing does not comport with "the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.'
9 6
CONCLUSION
Schall v. Martin discarded the Gault analysis for assessing due process
violations in the juvenile justice system. Gault had established a standard of
review that was logical and easily applied. Under Gault, a court should
analyze due process challenges to the juvenile justice system by first accurately
assessing what the due process requirements are for a defendant in the adult
criminal justice system. The court should then determine how the addition
or removal of the right would affect both the juvenile system and juvenile
defendants. This balancing analysis focuses the court's attention on the
unique needs of children. Special consideration must be given to the pro-
cedures necessary to accomplish the system's goal of rehabilitating the trou-
bled child.
The Schall Court gave no special consideration to the juvenile justice
system's goals. The Court purported to balance the "fundamental fairness"
of due process and the "informal" qualities of juvenile proceedings. This
balance, however, was never achieved. The Schall analysis inaccurately de-
picted the due process requirements for pretrial detention of adults, and also
unrealistically appraised the impact of compulsory probable cause hearings
on the juvenile justice system. The Schall decision, therefore, may seriously
curtail due process rights for children because it established no balancing
guidelines for courts to follow.
Mary Jane Boswell
even an investigation into, possible parental faltering. Rush, supra note 7, at 500. For example,
one child discussed in Schall was accused of attempted robbery and assault, and was held for
three weeks without a trial. The case was finally dismissed and the juvenile was released to his
father's custody. 104 S. Ct. at 2407. By giving the father custody of the child, the court
acknowledged that the father was, in fact, capable of taking care of the child. Because the
state could not show parental "faltering," no interest was served in detaining the child in the
first instance. The Court's reliance on parens patriae, therefore, was misplaced. Rush, supra
note 7, at 501.
195. See supra notes 55-59.
196. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30.
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